Abstract The ability to collectively toss a common coin among n parties in the presence of faults is an important primitive in the arsenal of randomized distributed protocols. In the case of dishonest majority, it was shown to be impossible to achieve less than 1 r bias in O(r ) rounds (Cleve STOC '86). In the case of honest majority, in contrast, unconditionally secure O(1)-round protocols for generating common perfectly unbiased coins follow from general completeness theorems on multi-party secure protocols in the perfectly secure channels model (e.g., BGW, CCD STOC '88). However, in the multi-party protocols with honest majority, parties must generate and hold local secret values which are assumed to be perfectly hidden from malicious parties: an assumption which is crucial to proving the resulting common coin is unbiased. This assumption unfortunately does not seem to This work was completed while the first author was under the support of an NDSEG graduate fellowship. This work was supported in part by Trustworthy Computing: NSF CCF-1018064. This material is based on research sponsored by the Air Force Research Laboratory under agreement number FA8750-11-2-0225. The US Government is authorized to reproduce and distribute reprints for Governmental purposes notwithstanding any copyright notation thereon. The views and conclusions contained herein are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies or endorsements, either expressed or implied, of the Air Force Research Laboratory or the US Government. This paper was originally invited to the special issue of Distributed Computing based on selected papers presented at DISC 2011. It appears separately due to publication delays. hold in practice, as attackers can launch side-channel attacks on the local state of honest parties and leak information on their secrets. In this work, we present an O(1)-round protocol for collectively generating an unbiased common coin, in the presence of leakage on the local state of the honest parties. We tolerate t ≤ ( 1 3 − )n computationally unbounded statically scheduled Byzantine faults and in addition a Θ(1)-fraction leakage on each (honest) party's secret state. Our results hold in the memory leakage model (of Akavia, Goldwasser, Vaikuntanathan '08) adapted to the distributed setting. Another contribution of our work is a tool we use to achieve collective coin flipping-leakage-resilient verifiable secret sharing (VSS). Informally, this is a variant of ordinary VSS in which secrecy guarantees are maintained even if information is leaked on individual shares of the secret.
Introduction
Randomization, and the ability to keep your local randomness and local state private, are fundamental ingredients at the disposal of fault-tolerant distributed algorithms. This was realized originating with the work of Rabin [35] , introducing the power of a shared global common coin to obtain a dramatic reduction in round complexity with respect to BenOr's asynchronous randomized consensus algorithm [3] ; 1 and continued to be utilized in many beautiful distributed algorithms to this day in various network models: synchronous and asynchronous, faulty majority and faulty minority, private channels and full information, and networks with and without broadcast channels.
The assumption that a party's local state-including its local randomness and the values of its secret cryptographic keys-is perfectly hidden from an adversary, is an assumption that has undergone much scrutiny in the past few years in the cryptographic community. This is in light of accumulating evidence which shows that in practice, physical measurements (so called side-channel attacks) can be made on honest parties' devices, which result in leakage from their local state that can completely compromise the security of the cryptographic algorithm. Indeed, a considerable amount of effort in the cryptographic community is devoted today to develop new cryptographic schemes which are resistant to leakage (e.g., [1, 10, 12, 17, 19, 26, 30, 32, 34, 37] and many more). Several models of leakage have been considered. The one most relevant to this work is that an adversary can adaptively choose polynomial time length-shrinking leakage functions and receive the value of the leakage functions on the secret state of the device, as long as the total amount of leakage is bounded (shorter than the secret state) [1] .
We propose to mirror this line of work in the regime of distributed fault tolerant algorithms. Namely, to address the question of how leakage from the local state of non-faulty parties affects the correctness of fault-tolerant distributed protocols. Here, in addition to the fact that some of the parties are faulty and fully compromised, the adversary who is coordinating the action of the faulty parties can obtain partial information in the form of leakage on the local state of all honest parties. This may potentially enable the adversary to alter the course of the protocol's execution. We note that in this context, the coordinating adversary can adaptively choose the leakage functions, depending on the history of communication it sees thus far.
Randomized distributed algorithms address many different tasks. In some tasks, such as Byzantine agreement, leader election, and collective coin tossing, the parties have no secret inputs and the emphasis is on getting the correct distribution over the outputs rather than on input privacy. In other tasks such as secure distributed function evaluation, both perfect input privacy and the correctness of output distribution are required. In this paper, we focus on the output correctness aspect of distributed protocols in the presence of leakage attacks. In particular, we provide a fault-tolerant and leakageresilient protocol for collective unbiased coin tossing among n parties.
The problem of collective coin tossing in a distributed setting has received a great deal of prior attention, starting with the work of Rabin [35] on distributed consensus. When there is no honest majority of parties, results from the two-party setting by Cleve [15] showed that a bias of Ω( 1 r ) must be incurred by any r -round protocol (this was recently shown optimal in a work of Moran et al. [33] ). Loosely speaking, the problem is that a dishonest party can bias the output by doing the following: At the last round, before sending his final message, he can compute the outcome, and abort if he does not favor this outcome, thus biasing the output. When there is an honest majority of parties, this attack can be prevented using verifiable secret sharing (VSS), a notion defined by Chor et al. [14] . Verifiable secret sharing allows each of the n parties to toss a coin locally and share it among the n parties. After all the local coins have been shared via a VSS, the parties reconstruct the different values. The output coin is set to be the result of simply taking the exclusive or of the local coins. The works of [4, 13] on secure multi-party computation show how to achieve VSS in expected O(1) rounds, and thus how to construct an unbiased coin tossing protocol that runs in O(1) rounds. These results [4, 13] hold unconditionally in the synchronous network model with less than a third Byzantine faults, assuming perfectly secure channels of communication between pairs of users and the use of a broadcast channel.
However, each of these protocols require the parties to generate and hold secret values, and security is guaranteed only under the assumption that these secrets are completely hidden from the adversarial view. It is easy to check that correctness breaks down if the adversary obtains some partial information about these secrets. This is the starting point of our work.
Before we go on to state our results, we remark that the more general problem of multi-party secure function evaluation (SFE), which addresses both correctness and privacy of parties' inputs, runs into immediate definitional problems in the presence of leakage attacks. Since leakage on the private inputs is available to the adversary, it is impossible to meet the SFE problem specification as is, since they require the inputs of honest parties to remain private beyond what is revealed by the SFE output value. Possible ways out of this conundrum may be to relax the attack model to allow some form of a leak-free pre-processing phase, or to relax the security guarantees of an SFE. Such relaxations were considered in [5, 7, 8] . 2 We refer the reader to these works for details.
Our contributions

Leakage-resilient coin tossing
We construct a leakage-resilient collective coin-tossing protocol in synchronous point-to-point networks with a broadcast channel and secure communication channels between pairs of parties.
We allow up to one third colluding statically corrupted malicious parties. Namely, a computationally unbounded rushing adversary can a priori choose parties to corrupt; dur-ing the protocol, he sees the internal state of all corrupted parties and can select the messages of these parties at any round, as a function of his entire view up to this point, including all honest parties' messages up to (and including) this round. In addition, the adversary can make leakage queries at every round, in the form of specifying a party and a leakage function, and obtain the result of the leakage functions applied to the internal state of the corresponding parties.
We allow the adversary to leak arbitrary functions of parties' secret states, as long as the total number of bits leaked from each party is at most some (pre-specified) λ fraction of its entire secret state. 3 Each leakage query is applied to the secret state of a single party. Since participants of a distributed protocol typically run on different physical hardware (and reside in different locations), we believe that it is reasonable to assume each leakage query modeling a physical measurement reveals information about each party's execution separately. To maximize generality within this setting, we allow the leakage queries on different parties' secret states to be interleaved (i.e., leak some from party i then some from party j, and then some more from party i), and the choice of leakage queries to be adaptively selected as a function of prior leakage. We remark that this distributed leakage model is similar to a model proposed by Akavia et al. [2] in their work on public-key encryption in which the secret key of the decryption algorithm is distributed among two parties.
We call a n-party distributed protocol (t, λ)-leakageresilient if it achieves its desired functionality in presence of an adversary who can control up to t parties and can leak up to a λ fraction of the internal secret state of each honest party (as above). We can now state our main theorem, to be formally stated within the paper. A few remarks are in order. 3 Our methods extend to also tolerate the Naor and Segev [34] leakage model which allows leakage functions which are not necessarily shrinking but leave the internal local state with enough min-entropy.
Fairness: We emphasize that our protocol achieves fairness, in the sense that even if the dishonest parties abort prematurely, the honest parties will output a random string.
Strings versus bits:
The output of our coin tossing protocol can be a long random string, as opposed to just a single bit.
In the leak-free setting, this point is not worth emphasizing, since the coin-tossing protocol can be run in parallel to output as many bits as desired. However, in the leaky setting, if we run many protocols in parallel, leakage bounds may deteriorate quickly: if we run k protocols, where each protocol tolerates leakage rate λ, then in the resulting parallel execution, the leakage rate becomes only λ k . Thus, to maintain leakage bounds we would need to run the protocol sequentially, resulting in many rounds of communication. Our protocol has the property that it can output as many bits as desired in a constant number of rounds with constant leakage rate.
Number of parties:
Note that the guarantees of our protocol improve with the number of participating parties. However, the tools we develop likely will also have useful implications for the setting with few parties.
Weakening the secure channels assumption: We assumed physically secure channels; however, our leakage model immediately implies we can tolerate leakage of information from these channels. This is because parties' messages are computed as a function of public information and their personal secret state, which we allow leakage on. To remove the secure channels assumption altogether, we would need to send the messages between honest parties using encryption, which would necessitate a computational assumption supporting the strength of the encryption algorithm. Furthermore, one would have to consider whether leakage from the secret keys of the decryption algorithm and the randomness used by the encryption algorithm can be tolerated. A recent work of Bitansky et al. [5] suggests that by sending messages encrypted with non-committing encryption (introduced by Canetti et al. [11] ), protocols in the secure channels model can be transformed into leakage-resilient secure protocols that do not assume secure channels.
Relation to using imperfect random sources in distributed computing: The question of achieving O(1)-round Byzantine Agreement and multi-party computation when parties do not have access to perfect local randomness, but rather to independent imperfect random sources such as min-entropy sources [25, 27, 28] , seems strongly related to our work here. Indeed, one may naturally view a random secret with leakage as a secret a-priori drawn from a min-entropy source. The crucial difference between these works and our own is that our leakage model allows the adversary to leak adaptively during the protocol, as opposed to nonadaptively before the protocol begins. More specifically, the approach taken in [25, 27, 28] is to first generate truly random strings from the weak random sources, and then to use these random strings in the underlying protocol execution. This approach will not work in our setting, since the adversary can simply choose to leak on the newly generated random strings. On the other hand, we note that the works of [25, 27, 28] consider randomness coming from an arbitrary min-entropy distribution, whereas our model considers perfect randomness that is being leaked so as to leave min-entropy in the distribution.
Coin flipping versus Byzantine agreement:
Achieving a weak form of collective coin tossing was an important building block to construct Byzantine agreement protocols in many works, most notably in the work of Dwork et al. [18] , and of Feldman and Micali [21] . Our collective coin tossing protocol utilizes a broadcast channel as a primitive (which is equivalent to Byzantine agreement), and thus obviously cannot be used to construct Byzantine agreement. It is an interesting question for future research how to achieve coin tossing in the presence of leakage without assuming broadcast channels.
Using coin tossing to force honest behavior: An important technique in multi-party protocols, initially proposed by Goldwasser and Micali [24] in their work on mental poker protocols, is to force parties to use the result of a common coin toss as their local randomness, to ensure parties do not rig their coins. In this case, the result of the coin toss will be known only to one party, Alice, and yet all other parties will be able to verify (via, say, zero-knowledge protocols) that Alice is using the result of the collective coins in her computations. This idea was later used in the compiler of [23] from the n-party SFE protocol against an honest-butcurious adversary to one against a malicious adversary. Our coin tossing protocol can similarly be turned into one where only one party Alice knows the result but all other parties can verify (via, say, a leakage-resilient zero knowledge protocol [22] ) that Alice is using the result of the collective coins in her computations. Note, however, that this yields security only assuming an honest majority.
Leakage-resilient verifiable secret sharing
One of the tools in our construction, which is of independent interest, is a new leakage-resilient verifiable secret sharing scheme. Verifiable secret sharing (VSS) extends Shamir's [38] secret sharing to ensure not only secrecy (i.e., corrupted parties do not gain information about the dealer's secret), but also unique reconstruction of a secret s even if the dealer and/or a subset of parties are dishonest, where for an honest dealer, s will be his original secret. Weakly leakage-resilient (WLR) VSS is a VSS scheme with the additional guarantee that given the view of any (t, λ) adversary who corrupts up to t parties and leaks a constant λ-fraction of each honest party's secret state (including the dealer's), the secret still retains a constant fraction of its original entropy. We refer to this property as weak leakage resilience. We now state our second main theorem.
Informal Theorem (WLR-VSS):
Let n = (3+δ)t for some constant δ > 0. Then for any constants < 1 and λ ≤ δ (1− ) 10+6δ , there exists a (t, λ)-leakage resilient VSS protocol that runs in O(1) rounds, with the following modified secrecy guarantee: If the dealer is honest during the sharing phase, with input distribution S, then for any (t, λ) adversary A, with high probability, given the view of A at the conclusion of the sharing phase, the distribution S retains fraction of its original entropy.
WLR-VSS is sufficient for our coin tossing construction; however, we also define and obtain a stronger version of leakage-resilient VSS, in which given the view of a leaking adversary, the secret s retains its full entropy. This stringent secrecy property rules out the possibility of standard VSS, since leakage from the dealer directly reveals information on s once it has been sampled. We thus put forth a new notion and a construction of oblivious secret sharing, where a dealer shares a uniformly distributed secret whose value he does not know. We believe that this primitive can serve as a useful building block for constructing future leakageresilient protocols, which anyway make use of VSS in this fashion (e.g., in [21] to achieve Byzantine Agreement). We refer the reader to Sect. 4.3 for details.
Disjoint committee election
As a tool in our construction, we present a 1-round publiccoin protocol for electing log 2 n disjoint "good" committees of size approximately n 1/2 from among n parties. This is achieved using a modified version of the Feige committee election protocol [20] , in which several of the "lightest bins" are elected (see Sect. 5).
Overview of our solution
Let us first see why simple and known coin tossing protocols are not resilient to leakage. Consider the following wellknown coin tossing protocol paradigm: First, each party P i chooses a random value r i and secret shares it to all other parties using a verifiable secret sharing (VSS) protocol. Then, all the parties reveal their shares and reconstruct r 1 , . . . , r n . Finally, the parties output ⊕r i . This protocol is not resilient to leakage for several reasons.
First, the reduction from coin tossing to VSS fails. For example, a malicious party P j can simply leak from each party P i the least significant bit of r i , and then choose r j such that the xor of these least significant bits is zero. Thus, the problem is that in the leaky setting, we cannot claim that the r i 's look random to the adversary. Instead, all we can claim is that they have high min-entropy. To address this problem, the first idea is to use a multi-source extractor instead of the xor function. Namely, output Ext(r 1 , . . . , r n ), where Ext is an extractor that takes n independent sources and outputs a string that is statistically close to uniform. Note however, that we cannot use just any such multi-source extractor, since some of the sources (i.e., some of the r j 's) may be chosen maliciously. Thus, what we need is a multi-source extractor that outputs a (statistically close to) uniform string, even if some of the sources are arbitrary, but independent of the "honest" sources. Indeed, such an extractor was constructed by Kamp et al. [29] .
Secondly, VSS protocols by and large are not resilient to leakage. Consider a single VSS protocol execution in the above paradigm. If the adversary leaks λ-fraction from each share, the total number of bits leaked is too large (indeed, potentially larger than the size of the secret being shared), and we cannot even guarantee that the secret r i has any min entropy. Thus, we cannot use just any VSS scheme, but rather we need to use a leakage-resilient one, with the guarantee that even if λ-fraction of each share is leaked, the secret still has high min-entropy. Indeed, we construct such a weakly leakage-resilient (WLR) VSS in Sect. 4.2. We note that many distributed protocols use VSS schemes, which immediately make them susceptible to leakage. Thus, our leakage-resilient VSS scheme may be useful for other protocols as well.
Finally, two technical difficulties remain. In the above coin-tossing paradigm utilizing WLR-VSS, each party shares his random value with all other n parties, and thus each honest party holds information on all secret values r i . Since the leakage is computed on a party's entire secret state, the adversary may learn information on the joint distribution of the r i 's. This creates a dependency issue: recall that the output of the multi-source extractor is only guaranteed to be random if the sources r i are independent. Further, in this paradigm the secret state of each party will be quite large, consisting of n secret shares (one for each secret value r i ). This will yield poor leakage bounds, with leakage rate less than 1 n , if we want to ensure no share of one particular secret can be entirely leaked.
We avoid these problems by ensuring that each of the n parties will never hold more than one secret share of the r i 's. To this end, we follow a two-step approach. The first step is a universe reduction idea similar to the one going back to Bracha [9] . Instead of having all parties generate and secret share random strings r i , we elect a small committee E (of size approximately log 2 n), and only the members of E choose a random string r i which will be shared via WLR-VSS (and later used in the construction of the collective coin). We utilize Feige's protocol [20] to elect this committee, which guarantees with high probability that the fraction of faulty parties in E is essentially the same as in the global network (see Sect. 2.4). The second idea is that members of this committee do not WLR-VSS the r i they chose to all n parties, but rather to small secondary committees. Namely, for every party i ∈ E, all parties elect a secondary subcommittee E i , and party P i will WLR-VSS her random string r i only to parties in E i . We need to ensure that all the secondary committees E i are disjoint, to avoid the case where one party has many shares. For this purpose, we consider a modified version of Feige's lightest bin committee election protocol [20] , in which we elect multiple (disjoint) committees by taking the several lightest bins. Care must be taken when electing several bins, since the adversary can "pool" his forces to target a single committee, and a failure in any one committee is a failure overall. However, in Proposition 2, we prove that for appropriately chosen parameters, (with overwhelming probability) the adversary still cannot force too many malicious parties to be elected in any committee.
Paper organization
In Sect. 2, we introduce some preliminaries and notation. Section 3 contains a discussion on the leakage model considered in this paper. In Sect. 4, we define and construct a leakage-resilient verifiable secret sharing scheme, a tool used in our construction. In Sect. 5, we present a protocol for electing several disjoint committees. Section 6 contains the construction and proof of our leakage-resilient coin tossing protocol.
Preliminaries
Distributions of random variables
for sufficiently large k, for all constant c > 0. We say an event occurs with overwhelming probability in k if it takes place with probability 1 − ν(k) for some negligible function ν(k).
Definition 2
The statistical distance between two distributions D 1 and D 2 on a space Ω is defined to be
We say that two distributions
We now define the min-entropy and average (conditional) min-entropy of a random variable.
Definition 4 Let (X, Z ) be a pair of random variables. The average min-entropy of X conditioned on Z is
We make use of the following lemma from [16] : 
Verifiable secret sharing
A secret sharing scheme, a notion introduced by Shamir [38] , is a protocol that allows a dealer who holds a secret input s, to share his secret among n parties. The guarantee is that even if t of the parties are malicious, they gain no information about the secret s. A verifiable secret sharing (VSS) scheme, introduced by Chor et al. [14] , is a secret sharing scheme with the additional guarantee that after the sharing phase, a dishonest dealer is either rejected, or is committed to a single secret s, that the honest parties can later reconstruct. Further, if the dealer is honest, then the original secret will be reconstructed, even if dishonest parties do not provide their correct shares.
Definition 5 (Verifiable Secret Sharing)
A VSS protocol tolerating t malicious parties for parties P = {P 1 , . . . , P n } is a two-phase protocol (Share, Rec), where a distinguished dealer P * ∈ P holds an initial input s, such that the following conditions hold for any adversary controlling at most t parties:
-Reconstruction: After the sharing phase, there exists a value s such that all honest parties output s in the reconstruction phase. -Validity: If the dealer is honest, then s = s.
-Secrecy: If the dealer is honest, then at the end of the sharing phase the joint view of the malicious parties is independent of the dealer's input s.
Multi-source randomness extractors
A multi-source randomness extractor is a deterministic function which takes as input independent sources, each with sufficient amount of min-entropy, and outputs a string that is statistically close to uniform.
Two-source extractors
Constructions of two-source extractors are given, for example, by Raz [36] and Bourgain [6] . We use the following simplified version of the Bourgain result in the construction of leakage-resilient oblivious VSS in Sect. 4.3. 
Robust multi-source extractors
In this work, we need a (stronger) multi-source extractor that extracts randomness even if some of the sources are "malicious," but independent of the "honest" ones. 4 Such an extractor, which we refer to as a robust multi-source extractor, was constructed by Kamp et al. [29] . 
Feige committee election protocol
Our leakage-resilient coin flipping protocol uses Feige's lightest bin committee election protocol as a subroutine [20] . Feige's protocol gives a method for selecting a committee of approximately k parties for any given parameter k. 5 It consists of one round, in which each party P i chooses and broadcasts a random integer "bin" b i ∈ n k . The committee consists of the parties in the "lightest bin": that is, those parties P j whose value b j was selected by the smallest number of total parties. See Fig. 1 for an explicit description of the protocol.
We remark that the Feige election protocol is immediately leakage resilient, as parties do not maintain any secret state. 
Proof We first note that the lightest bin necessarily contains no more than n/( n k ) = k parties, implying Property (1). For each bin b and honest party i, we define the indicator variable X i,b to be 1 if and only if party i selects bin b. Since we consider only honest parties, this is a Bernoulli random variable with p = k n . For a particular bin b, we can now bound the probability that few honest parties selected this bin as compared to the expected value (1 − β)k.
where the second inequality holds by a Chernoff bound. 6 Now, taking a union bound, the probability that any bin b has fewer than (1 − β − )k honest parties will be 6 Exact Chernoff bound used: For X 1 , . . . , X n independent Bernoulli random variables and μ = E[ i X i ], then for 0 < δ < 1, it holds that
proving Property (2). Finally, combining Properties (1) and (2), we have that with probability 1 −
implying Property (3).
Remark 1
We further note that a stronger statement of Property (2) of Lemma 2 follows from the proof above: namely, with high probability, each bin will have several honest parties in it (not just the elected bin E). That is,
Corollary 1 Feige's lightest bin protocol for k = log 2 n is a 1-round public-coin protocol such that for any set of corrupted parties C of size βn, for any constant > 0, with overwhelming probability in n, a committee E will be elected such that (1 − β − ) log 2 n ≤ |E| ≤ log 2 n and
In our leakage-resilient coin tossing protocol, we will make use of the Feige committee election protocol with two different sets of parameters: one to elect a supreme committee of approximate size log 2 n, and another within our disjoint committee election protocol to elect committee(s) of approximate size √ n.
Modeling leakage in distributed protocols
We consider synchronous point-to-point networks with a broadcast channel. Point-to-point channels are assumed to be authenticated and to provide partial privacy guarantees (see discussion below). We consider n-party protocols where up to t statically corrupted parties perform arbitrary malicious faults. More precisely, we consider a computationally unbounded adversary who sees the internal state of all corrupted parties and controls their actions. We also assume the adversary is rushing, i.e. in any round he can wait until all honest parties send their messages before selecting the messages of corrupted parties. Our results hold information theoretically, with no computational assumptions. In this work we propose a strengthening of the standard model, where in addition the adversary is able to leak a constant fraction of information on the secret state of each (honest) party. We model this by allowing the adversary to adaptively make leakage queries (i, f ) throughout the protocol, where i ∈ [n] and f : {0, 1} * → {0, 1}, and giving him the evaluation of f on the secret state of party i. Note that this also captures leakage on communication channels, as parties' messages are computed as a function of public information and their personal secret state; thus, we do not need to assume fully private channels, but rather channels that achieve privacy with bounded information leakage.
For simplicity, we consider length-bounded leakage. Namely, we require that no more than λ|state i | leakage queries can be made on any single party i's secret state for some leakage rate λ, where |state i | denotes the maximal size of the secret state of party i at any given time during the protocol. But, our constructions work equally well in the more general model of [34] where the output length of the leakage on state i is not restricted, as long as the entropy of state i is decreased by no more than the fraction λ.
Note that in this model, each leakage query is applied to the secret state of a single party. Since participants of a distributed protocol typically run on different physical hardware (and in fact in many cases in different locations across the world), it is reasonable to assume each physical attack reveals information about one party's execution. To maximize generality within this setting, we allow leakage queries on different parties' secret states to be interleaved (i.e., leak from party i, then from party j, and then again from party i), and to be adaptively selected as a function of prior leakage.
We assume honest parties have the ability to generate randomness on the fly. This assumption is crucial for achieving leakage resilience, and is a natural requirement in a leaky setting, where any values that are held unnecessarily long over time suffer from additional leakage attacks.
We refer to such an adversary who can corrupt t parties and leak λ fraction from the secret state of each honest party as a (t, λ) adversary, and say that a distributed protocol is (t, λ) leakage resilient if its original properties are satisfied against such an adversary. See Fig. 2 for a full description of the (t, λ) adversarial model.
In this paper, we will focus on constructing a leakageresilient unbiased coin tossing protocol.
Definition 6 (Leakage-resilient distributed coin tossing) A protocol for parties P = {P 1 , . . . , P n } is a (t, λ) leakageresilient m-bit distributed coin tossing protocol if the following conditions hold for any (t, λ) adversary A with overwhelming probability in n:
-Agreement: At the conclusion of the protocol, each party outputs a value v i ∈ {0, 1} m . For all honest parties P i , P j , it holds that v i = v j . -Randomness: (Even if malicious parties abort prematurely), it holds that
where V |view A is the distribution of the honest output value v conditioned on the view of A (over the randomness of honest parties), U m is the uniform distribution over {0, 1} m , and ν(n) is a negligible function in n.
Fig. 2 Model of (t, λ) adversarial interaction
Verifiable secret sharing with leakage
One of the subroutines in our leakage-resilient coin tossing protocol is a protocol achieving verifiable secret sharing (VSS) in the presence of leakage. Recall the standard VSS guarantee is that for any adversary A who corrupts up to t parties, a dishonest dealer is committed to a single secret which will be reconstructed by honest parties, and the secret input s of an honest dealer retains full entropy given the view of A at the conclusion of the sharing phase. For our purposes, we will need stronger guarantees, where for any adversary A who corrupts up to t parties and leaks λ-fraction of each honest party's secret state (including the dealer's), the VSS reconstruction property still holds, and the secret input s of an honest dealer retains a constant fraction of its original entropy given the entire view of A (including leakage). We refer to this property as weak leakage resilience. In Sect. 4.1, we show that a modified version of the Shamir secret sharing scheme [38] satisfies a notion of weak leakage resilience. In Sect. 4.2, we use this underlying secret sharing scheme to construct a weakly leakage-resilient VSS protocol by incorporating a method of verifying that the dealer has distributed good shares.
We note that one can define a stronger version of leakageresilient VSS, with the requirement that the secret looks uniform even if all the shares are partially leaked. Although this stronger version is not required for our coin-tossing construction, we believe that it is of independent interest. We formally define and construct such a protocol in Sect. 4.3.
Throughout this section, we denote by s the secret value being shared, and we denote by S the distribution of s. For our applications, S is always uniform; however, we state our results for general distributions S.
Weakly
We modify the standard Shamir secret sharing scheme in two ways. First, we take d to be strictly greater than the number of corrupted parties. Second, we take the relative size of the secret to be larger: instead of s being a single element s ∈ F embedded as the single coefficient a 0 , we consider secrets s ∈ This leaves us with the question of how to set d, given values for n and t. The larger the d we choose, the more leakage we will be able to tolerate while maintaining entropy in the secret s. However, we also require the original secret to be recoverable even if t parties reveal incorrect shares. To achieve this we rely on the decoding properties of the Shamir secret sharing scheme when viewed as a Reed-Solomon error-correcting code [31] . Namely, we can uniquely (and efficiently) decode any vector of secret shares with up to
errors. To guarantee decoding of up to t errors, we must have d ≤ n − 2t − 1. To maximize leakage resilience while maintaining unique decoding, we will thus take d = n − 2t − 1.
We now formalize the scheme described above, which we denote by (SS, RecSS). 
Weakly leakage-resilient VSS
In our coin tossing protocol, we make use of a VSS protocol satisfying the following notion of weak leakage resilience.
Definition 7 (WLR-VSS) A (λ, )-weakly leakage-resilient VSS protocol tolerating t malicious parties
for parties P = {P 1 , . . . , P n } is a VSS protocol such that for any (t, λ) adversary A, with overwhelming probability in the security parameter k, the following are satisfied:
-Reconstruction, validity: The standard VSS reconstruction and validity properties hold. -Secrecy: For any distribution S, if the dealer is honest during the sharing phase with secret input distribution S, then with overwhelming probability in k over the distribution of the view of A at the conclusion of the sharing phase of the protocol
We emphasize that the security level of the WLR-VSS depends on the security parameter k, which may be selected independent of the number of parties. We now construct a (λ, )-weakly leakage-resilient VSS protocol (Share WLR , Rec WLR ), taking inspiration from the VSS construction of [4] . We use as a black box the secret sharing scheme (SS, RecSS) with polynomial degree d = n − 2t − 1 (see Sect. 4.1 above).
At a high level, the WLR-VSS protocol proceeds as follows. First, the dealer secret shares his input s, and two additional random values r, r , via three executions of SS. Using the additive homomorphic property of SS, the parties check the dealer by broadcasting a (randomly selected) linear combination of their given shares, and verifying that together they form a valid codeword. To protect an honest dealer from being disqualified due to malicious parties giving bad values, the dealer will broadcast the true shares of complaining parties, and these values will be verified in a second (independent) check of the same form.
Loosely, since a dishonest dealer does not know what linear combinations will be chosen, it is unlikely that he can distribute bad shares that pass both of these tests. Leakage information will not help, as the only secret values in the protocol are the distributed shares, which the dealer already knows (in fact, chooses) himself. On the other hand, no information on an honest dealer's secret s is revealed from the linear combinations, since shares of s are masked by shares of the random r, r . So the only information learned about s comes from leakage, which leaves sufficient entropy remaining by the properties of SS.
Let F be a field with log |F| = kn, where k is the security parameter. We define (Share WLR , Rec WLR ) in Fig. 3 .
Theorem 3 Let n = (3 + δ)t for some constant δ > 0.
Then for any constants < 1 and λ ≤
is a (λ, )-weakly leakage-resilient VSS protocol tolerating t malicious parties that runs in O(1) rounds.
Proof We show that (Share WLR , Rec WLR ) satisfies the validity, reconstruction, and secrecy properties described in Definition 7.
Validity. If the dealer is honest, then only malicious parties can complain of bad shares; the dealer will broadcast honest shares to the complaining parties and thus will not be rejected. Further, by the unique decoding property of the underlying secret sharing scheme (SS, RecSS) (i.e., Property 1.1), any secret sharing of s with up to t corrupted shares will be uniquely decoded to yield the original secret s.
Reconstruction. Consider the case of a dishonest dealer: we show that if the dealer is not rejected, then at the end of the sharing phase all honest parties hold consistent shares of some value s. This will be sufficient to argue that all honest parties will output s at the conclusion of the reconstruction phase, again by Property 1.1. Before we prove the lemma, we introduce some notation and prove a claim that we will invoke later. Let H ⊆ [n] be the set of honest parties. For any vector v ∈ F n and subset W ⊆ [n], we denote by v W the vector in F |W | formed by taking the components v i with i ∈ W . We say that a set of shares v W is "d-consistent" if the interpolation of the corresponding points yields a polynomial of degree no greater than d. Note that any set of at most d + 1 shares is trivially d-consistent.
Lemma 3 If the dealer is accepted in the sharing phase of the protocol, then at the conclusion of the sharing phase all honest parties hold shares consistent with a single degree-d polynomial.
Proof Consider the term of highest degree ax d in p 1 , and let bx d and cx d be the terms of corresponding degree in p 2 and p 3 .
We will use this claim to argue that if any collection of shares 
where the second inequality follows from the union bound and Claim 4.1, and the last equality follows from the fact that n = (3+δ)t. 
Proof At the conclusion of the sharing phase, the view of the adversary consists of five pieces of information: (1) his internal randomness rand A (which, without loss of generality, is sampled before the protocol execution, independent of all learned information), (2) the secret shares of corrupted parties (s i , r i , r i ) i∈C , (3) the honest parties'
∈C to the coefficients, (4) the corresponding linear combinations of honest parties' shares {αs j + βr j + γ r j } j / ∈C , {αs j +βr j + γ r J } j / ∈C , and (5) the answers to his leakage queries leakage. (Recall that the adversary's contribution to the coefficients
) i∈C on behalf of corrupted parties is determined by the remaining portions of his view). For each variable in the view of A, we denote its corresponding distribution with capital letters.
Note that by Lemma 2.2(a) of [16] (see Lemma 1 of the present), it holds with overwhelming probability in k over
Thus, it suffices to analyze the average conditional min entropy of S given the distribution
We accomplish this via a sequence of intermediate claims.
Our first step (Claim 4.2) amounts to proving that the secret shares of corrupted parties (S i , R i , R i ) i∈C are independent of the secrets S, R, R , and that the linear combinations of the honest parties' secret shares {αS j + β R j + γ R j } j / ∈C , {αS j +β R j +γ R J } j / ∈C do not reveal additional information beyond the underlying linear combinations of secrets, (αS + β R + γ R ) and (αS +β R +γ R ). 9 Claim For every LEAKAGE, there exists a distribution LEAKAGE with |LEAKAGE | = |LEAKAGE| for which
are uniformly random given S, R, R , and RAND A .
Proof We will show the distribution of the entire view of the adversary V I EW A (S) can be simulated given only
Recall that in the secret sharing scheme (Share, Reconstruct), shares of a secret value s ∈ F δt are evaluations of a random polynomial over F of fixed degree d whose δt lowest coefficients correspond to s. Given s, this distribution of secret shares can equivalently be generated by selecting at random the first d + 1 − δt polynomial evaluations, and then solving (deterministically) for all remaining evaluations to be consistent with s. In particular, taking the set of corrupt parties' shares to be among the first d +1−δt, and defining d := d +1−δt, we have the following equivalence of distributions:
where U m denotes the uniform distribution over F m , and Share is a deterministic function. The same holds for shares of R and R . Now, denote by U S d , U R d , U R d the randomness sampled for the sharing of S, R, R , respectively. By the homomorphic properties of the polynomial secret sharing scheme (i.e., adding two polynomials corresponds to adding evaluations point-wise, and also to adding coefficients termwise), it holds that the shares of the (α, β, γ )-linear combination of these secret shares of S, R, R are given by
The same holds for the (α,β,γ )-linear combinations of shares. Namely,
and the linear combinations of secrets (αS + β R + γ R ), (αS +β R +γ R ), one can exactly simulate the following portions of the adversary's view:
are simulated analogous to items 2 and 3 above, using the coefficientsα,β,γ in the place of α, β, γ . 5. Leakage on any secret share S j , R j , R j can be simulated given the same amount of leakage directly on S, R, and R , since all shares can be reconstructed given these secrets, together with the information
We next argue that revealing the sums (αS + β R + γ R ) and (αS +β R +γ R ) does not decrease the entropy of S by too much. This is done via the following two claims.
Claim For any distribution Y , it holds that
Proof Follows directly by the chain rule for min entropy (see Lemma 1) .
Claim With overwhelming probability in k over the randomness of honest parties in the protocol, it holds that
is nonsingular, and hence the distributions S, (αS + β R + γ R ), (αS +β R +γ R) and (S, R, R ) are in bijection. In this case, the claim follows. It thus remains to show that βγ =βγ will hold with overwhelming probability in k within the protocol.
Recall that each coefficient is selected one round at a time, in which every honest party samples and broadcasts k random bits, and the adversary arbitrarily selects k bits on behalf of each corrupted party. First, note that with overwhelming probability in k, no coefficient α, β, γ ,α,β,γ ∈ F will be the element 0. This is because this would require every honest party to have randomly sampled k bits of 0 for his contribution to the coefficient, which will only occur with probability 2 −k(n−|C|) ∈ 2 −Ω(kn) . Now, consider the selection round for the final coefficient γ . At this point, β, γ , andβ are each completely determined. Then, even if the adversary could completely choose their values maliciously (subject to them being nonzero), there will exist a single "bad" value ofγ ∈ F (namely, β −1β γ ∈ F). But, as above, because the honest parties are sampling their bits at random, the probability that this exact element will be selected is bounded by 2 −Ω(kn) .
We now address the leakage information.
Claim It holds that
Proof Follows by Lemma 2.2(b) of [16] (see Lemma 1 in the present), since |LEAKAGE | = .
We are ready for our final claim.
, corresponding to the adversary's internal randomness (chosen without loss of generality at random, before the protocol begins), the honest parties' random contributions to the coefficients, and the randomness used for secret sharing, are each sampled independent of (S, R, R ).
Further, R and R are also sampled at random from F δt by the honest dealer, independent of each other and S. Hence, H ∞ (S, R, R ) = H ∞ (S) + δt log |F| + δt log |F|, as required.
Combining Claims 4.2-4.2, we have that
where the first line holds since |(αS + β R + γ R )| = |(αS + β R +γ R )| = δt log |F|. Thus, as discussed above, it holds by Lemma 2.2(a) of [16] (Lemma 1 of the present) that with overwhelming probability in k over view A ← V I EW A (S) that
Remark 2 Note that the proof of Lemma 4 holds also for a stronger adversarial leakage model, in which the adversary may leak on the joint secret state of all honest parties. That is, the VSS protocol of Fig. 3 satisfies the property that leaking bits on any secret information during the protocol cannot reveal significantly more than bits of information on the secret s, without requiring the leakage to take place independently on each party. However, independent leakage will be required for later parts of the overall coin tossing protocol.
What remains is to prove that H ∞ (S) − − log 2 n ≥ H ∞ (S), where is the total amount of leakage. Recall that the adversary can leak λ = δ(1− ) 10+6δ fraction of each honest party's secret state. Further, recall that the secret state contains only those values that must remain secret (whereas other values generated by honest parties are assumed to be given to the adversary in their entirety; see Fig. 2 and discussion in Sect. 3). The secret state of each non-dealer party consists of precisely three elements of F, corresponding to his shares s i , r i , and r i . (Note that α i , β i , γ i ,α i ,β i ,γ i are not part of the secret state, since they are broadcast immediately after being generated). The dealer must hold additional secret information, since he must be able to produce a valid secret share for any complaining party in Round 6. Thus, he must store 3(d + 1) = 3(1 + δ)t secret elements of F, corresponding to the coefficients of the secret sharing polynomials for s, r , and r . Thus,
Combining this with Lemma 4, we have that with overwhelming probability (and for sufficiently large n):
Thus, the protocol (Share WLR , Rec WLR ) satisfies the properties of a (λ, )-weakly leakage-resilient VSS protocol.
Leakage-resilient oblivious VSS
For our coin tossing protocol, we only need VSS achieving a weak notion of leakage resilience, where for any adversary who corrupts t parties and leaks a constant fraction of the secret state of the remaining parties, the secret still retains a constant fraction of its original entropy. However, one can also consider a stronger version of leakage resilience, where the secret retains its full entropy. Naturally, this notion cannot be achieved if any party knows the secret in its entirety, since the adversary can simply leak on this value outright. In particular, this immediately rules out the possibility of standard VSS, since the dealer himself cannot know the secret! We thus put forth the notion of oblivious secret sharing, where the dealer secret shares a uniformly distributed secret, whose value he does not know. We also show that this is, in fact, achievable (see below). We believe that leakage-resilient oblivious VSS primitives can serve as a useful building block for constructing future leakage-resilient protocols, which anyway make use of VSS in this fashion (e.g., in [21] to achieve Byzantine Agreement).
Definition 8 (Leakage-resilient oblivious VSS)
A λ-leakage-resilient oblivious VSS protocol for parties P = {P 1 , . . . , P n } tolerating t malicious parties is a VSS protocol satisfying the following for any (t, λ) adversary A, with overwhelming probability in n:
-Reconstruction: The standard VSS reconstruction property holds. -Validity: If the dealer is honest during the sharing phase, then the distribution S of the value reconstructed in the second phase (over the randomness of the dealer in the sharing phase) is uniform. -Secrecy: If the dealer is honest during the sharing phase, then the distribution V I EW A of the view of A at the conclusion of this phase is independent of S . In other words, S |V I EW A is uniform.
Even without leakage considerations, it is not immediately clear whether one can hope to achieve oblivious secret sharing robust to malicious parties. Consider, as an example, the Shamir secret sharing scheme. The dealer can sample random values for individual shares; but in order to ultimately make the shares consistent, he must somehow sample from a polynomial-without knowing the polynomial! We show that this can be done. In "Appendix", we present a λ leakage-resilient (oblivious) VSS protocol for λ = Ω(1), tolerating t ≤ n 3+δ malicious parties (for any constant δ > 0). 10 Our construction uses the tool of a weakly leakageresilient VSS protocol as a black box (see Definition 7). At a high level, the protocol works by having the dealer sample and share two random values x and y using the weakly leakage-resilient protocol; the final output will be Ext 2 (x, y), where Ext 2 is a two-source extractor. To ensure that information is never leaked on x and y together, the dealer first samples and verifiably secret shares x, erases it, then samples and verifiably secret shares y. (Note that we do not need to assume complete erasures, but rather can allow some fraction of information to remain, which is simply treated as leakage). As before, to ensure independence, instead of sharing x and y to all parties, he will share x and y among two disjoint committees, which are selected by all parties using a version of the Feige committee election protocol. Proof See "Appendix".
Disjoint committee election
Recall that the Feige committee election protocol enables selection of a single "good" committee of some approximate 10 However, note that the guarantees of our protocol require a large number of parties. 11 The λ ≤ size k in one round of communication. We now exhibit a oneround public-coin protocol for simultaneously electing several (m = log 2 n) disjoint "good" committees E 1 , . . . , E m , each of size approximately n 1/2 .
Let m = log 2 n and k = n 1/2 . We consider the Feige lightest bin protocol with n k bins (see Sect. 2.4), where instead of taking just the lightest bin, we elect the m lightest bins. More explicitly, we define the protocol ElectDisj as follows. In a single round, each party i ∈ [n] broadcasts a random value r i ← n k . For j = 1, . . . , m, the jth committee E j is defined to be the parties in the jth lightest bin (where ties are further ordered by the existing bin numbering).
Proposition 2
The protocol ElectDisj is a 1-round publiccoin protocol for electing m = log 2 n committees E i such that for any constants β, > 0, and any set of corrupted parties C ⊂ [n] of size βn, the following events simultaneously occur with overwhelming probability in n:
Proof Property (1) (1))n 1/2 for each i. Indeed, if this holds, then Property (2) holds, and further, with overwhelming probability we will have
Suppose there exists an elected committee E i for which |E i | = n 1/2 + . We will argue that with overwhelming probability, ∈ o(n 1/2 ). Since E i is one of the log 2 n lightest bins, it must be that each of the remaining n 1/2 − log 2 n bins has size at least n 1/2 + . Now, we know that with overwhelming probability, each of the log 2 n elected bins E i has at least (1 − β − 2 )n 1/2 honest parties. This means that (with overwhelming probability), the total number of parties in all remaining (non-elected) bins can be no greater than
Thus, with overwhelming probability, we must have
In particular, this implies that each elected committee E i must satisfy
as desired.
Unbiased coin tossing with leakage
In this section, we construct our final leakage-resilient coin tossing protocol, as characterized by Definition 6. Our construction makes black-box use of the tools developed in the previous sections: in particular, a weakly leakageresilient verifiable secret sharing (WLR-VSS) protocol (from Sect. 4.2), and a disjoint committee election protocol (from Sect. 5).
Recall we are within the model of a synchronous point-topoint network with broadcast, and that channels are assumed to be authenticated and private (with leakage). Our results are information theoretic, without cryptographic assumptions. Proof Let δ be any constant such that δ < δ, and take F to be a field for which log |F| ≥ max 2n, m .99
(where the second requirement comes from the output length properties of the extractor). In Fig. 4 , we construct the desired coin tossing protocol CoinToss using the following tools: By Proposition 2, with overwhelming probability in n, the disjoint secondary committees E i will be "good," in that they each have size n 1/2−ζ ≤ |E i | ≤ n 1/2+ζ for any constant ζ > 0 and it holds that n i ≥ (3 + δ )t i , where n i = |E i | and t i = |E i ∩ C| (where C is the set of corrupted parties). We will thus assume this is the case. Since n i ≥ (3+δ )t i , the validity, reconstruction, and secrecy properties of the (λ, ) WLR-VSS protocol (see Definition 7) will hold for the ith execution of (Share WLR , Rec WLR ) with overwhelming probability in n i (and thus in n). We now show that the protocol CoinToss satisfies the desired agreement and randomness properties (see Definition 6) .
Agreement. By the reconstruction property of the WLR-VSS protocol, for each P i ∈ E, the honest parties in E i will agree on the reconstructed value r i ← Rec WLR () and will broadcast this value to all parties in Step 4 (where r i = 0 if P i was rejected as a dealer in the sharing phase of the VSS). Since a majority of the parties in E i are honest, all honest parties in [n] will agree on r * i = r i for each i, and so will agree on the final output r .
Randomness.
Consider the values r i reconstructed by each secondary committee E i . By the reconstruction property of the WLR-VSS, each r i is fully determined by the conclusion of the sharing phase (Step 3 of the CoinToss proto-col). The secrecy property of the WLR-VSS implies that with overwhelming probability at the end of the sharing phase, even given the view of the adversary up to this point (view A ), each honest party's random variable R i retains at least · (δ t log |F|) bits of entropy. We now argue that, after conditioning on view A (which includes leakage), the resulting distributions (R *   1 |view A ) , . . . , (R * |E| |view A ) over F δ t remain independent, where for all j ∈ E ∩ C we think of R * j as fixed. This is proved via induction on the number of leakage queries made by the adversary. In the base case, before any leakage queries are made, the adversary's view is independent of R * i for all honest parties P i (by the secrecy properties of the WLR-VSS and underlying secret sharing scheme), and the claim holds directly. Now, suppose that (R *   1 |view A ) , . . . , (R * |E| |view A ) are independent after the first j leakage queries. Recall that a leakage query is made on the secret state of a single party. Further, in the protocol, any given party P i is contained in at most one secondary committee E i , and thus only sends, receives, and holds information on at most one random variable R * i . Thus, a leakage query response on the secret state of party P i can reveal information on a single variable R * i but is independent of all the other variables.
(Note that this holds even when the choice of queried leakage function depends on prior leakage information on other variables, as this does not reveal new information on these other variables).
Therefore, we know that(R * 1 |view A ), . . . , (R * |E| |view A ) are independent random variables, and together they have total min-entropy at least (|E\C|)( δ t log |F|). By Lemma 2, |E\C| ≥ (1 − 1 3+δ − ζ ) log 2 n for any constant ζ > 0, with overwhelming probability in n. Since the robust multisource extractor we use can extract even when many of the sources R * j are fixed, we can simply take the loose bound |E\C| ≥ 2 3 log 2 n. Hence, by Theorem 2, the final output r = Ext({r * i } i∈C ) will be statistically close (w.r.t. n) to uniform over {0, 1} m with m = .99( 2 3 log 2 n)( δ t log |F|).
Appendix: Proof of Theorem 4
In this section, we provide a construction and proof of a leakage-resilient oblivious VSS protocol.
Proof (Proof of Theorem 4) Let δ be any constant such that δ < δ. Fix any constant 0 < < 1. We construct the desired protocol (Share LR , Rec LR ), making use of the following tools:
1. Elect: Feige's 1-round public-coin protocol to elect a primary committee of size approximately n = n , as in Lemma 2. A description of the protocol (Share LR , Rec LR ) is given in Fig. 5 . By Lemma 2, with overwhelming probability in n, both committees E 1 , E 2 will be "good," in that they each have size n /2 ≤ |E i | ≤ n and it holds that n i ≥ (3+δ )t i , where n i = |E i | and t i = |E i ∩ C| for i ∈ {1, 2}. We will thus assume this is the case. Since n i ≥ (3 + δ )t i , the validity, reconstruction, and secrecy properties of the (λ, 2 )-weakly leakage-resilient VSS protocol (see Definition 7) will hold for the ith execution of (Share WLR , Rec WLR ) with overwhelming probability in n i (and thus in n).
We now show that (Share LR , Rec LR ) satisfies the reconstruction and secrecy properties given in Definition 8.
Reconstruction By the reconstruction property of the underlying λ-weakly leakage-resilient VSS protocol, the honest parties in E 1 (respectively, in E 2 ) will agree on the reconstructed value x ← Rec WLR () (resp, y ← Rec WLR ), it will hold that x = x (resp, y = y), and the honest parties will broadcast this value to all parties in Step 1 of the reconstruction phase. Since a majority of the parties in E i are honest, all honest parties in [n] will agree on the values of x * = x, y * = y, and thus will output the same value Ext 2 (x * , y * ).
Secrecy Assume the dealer is honest. Note that since the dealer erases x (and all values related to x) before generating y, any leakage function will be a function of purely x or y, when conditioned on prior leakage.
Thus, conditioned on the leakage, the distribution of x and y will be independent. By the secrecy property of the underlying λ-weakly leakage-resilient VSS protocol, given the view of the adversary, both x and y retain at least 1 2 of their original entropy. Therefore, by Theorem 1, the final output Ext 2 (x, y) will be statistically close to uniform over {0, 1} m for m = Ω(k).
